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Does the human visual system contain a specialized system for face recognition, not used for the 
recognition of other objects? This question was addressed using the "face inversion effect" which refers 
to the loss of our normal proficiency at face perception when faces are inverted. We found that a 
prosopagnosic subject paradoxically performed better at matching inverted faces than upright faces, 
the opposite of the normal "face inversion effect". The fact that his impairment was most pronounced 
with the stimuli for which normal subjects show the greatest proficiency in face perception provides 
evidence of a neurologically localized module for upright face recognition in humans. An additional 
implication of these data is that specialized systems may control behavior even when they are 
malfunctioning and therefore maladeaptive, consistent with the mandatory operation of such systems 
according to the "modularity" hypothesis of the cognitive architecture. 
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Is face recognition accomplished using a specialized 
subsystem of the visual system, or are faces recognized 
in the same way as other objects? Single unit recordings 
in nonhuman primates have revealed populations of 
cells that respond selectively to faces, in some cases 
responding differentially to particular faces, suggesting a 
role for these cells in face recognition (e.g. Bruce, 
Desimone & Gross, 1981; Perret, Rolls & Caan, 1982; 
Baylis, Rolls & Leonard, 1985; see Desimone, 1991 for 
a recent review). However, faces may not be unique 
visual stimuli n this regard, as cells have also been found 
that respond to nonface objects, although the selectivity 
and strength of such responses i  weaker (Baylis et al., 
1985). The interpretation of the "face cell" literature 
with respect o the question posed at the outset is further 
complicated by the observation that monkey's face 
recognition performance is not seriously impaired 
when the area richest in face cells, the superior temporal 
sulcus, is ablated bilaterally (Heywood & Cowey, 
1992). 
Potentially the strongest evidence of a specialized 
neural system dedicated to face recognition comes from 
human prosopagnosia. Prosopagnosia s the apparently 
selective impairment of face recognition following brain 
damage. Although such individuals frequently manifest 
some slight difficulty with the recognition of common 
*Department of Psychology, University of  Pennsylvania, 3815 Walnut 
Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6196, U.S.A. 
tUniversity of Michigan. 
$Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH 44074, U.S.A. 
objects, particularly in pictures, they appear far more 
impaired at face recognition, failing to recognize friends 
and close family members by sight. Although proso- 
pagnosia is most naturally explained by damage to a 
specialized face processor, an alternative interpretation 
is possible, and is indeed frequently offered in the 
modern neuropsychology literature. 
Proponents of the more parsimonious view, that 
there is a single visual recognition system for faces and 
nonface objects, have pointed out that faces may be 
more difficult to recognize than most objects because 
faces are more complex than many other objects and 
very similar to one another (e.g. Brown, 1972; Damasio, 
Damasio & Van Hoesen, 1982; Gloning, Gloning, 
Jellinger & Quatember, 1970; Mesulam, 1987). From 
this point of view, it is plausible that prosopagnosia 
results from mild damage to a general-purpose object 
recognition system. 
Distinguishing between these two accounts of proso- 
pagnosia requires that the prosopagnosic's performance 
on faces and nonface control stimuli be assessed relative 
to normal subjects. In this way it is possible to deter- 
mine whether prosopagnosics are disproportionately im- 
paired at face recognition. Several recent studies have 
attempted to assess the true selectivity of prosopagnosia 
by comparing recognition performance with faces and 
nonface objects whose difficulty level for normal subjects 
is known. 
Grusser, Kirchkoff and Naumann (1990) devised a 
recognition memory test with photographs of faces 
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and art nouveau vases, and administered it to a variety 
of brain-damaged patients and control subjects. They 
found that, relative to normal control subjects, patients 
performed worse on the faces, although there was no 
significant different between left and right hemisphere 
damage, or between the different aphasia-types of the 
left hemisphere group. This finding suggests that faces 
may be differentially vulnerable to brain damage in 
general. However, none of the patients tested had proso- 
pagnosia, or even lesions in temporo-occipitat cortex, the 
territory associated with prosopagnosia. McNeil and 
Warrington (1993) compared the recognition perform- 
ance of a prosopagnosic subject with human and sheep 
faces, and found the prosopagnosic mpaired only with 
human faces. In an experiment with a different proso- 
pagnosic subject, Farah, Klein and Levinson (1995) used 
a variety of common objects (chairs, scissors etc.) in one 
experiment and eyeglass frames in another experiment as 
the nonface objects, and again found the prosopagnosic 
to be more impaired with faces, relative to normal 
control subjects. 
The results of these studies challenge the hypothesis 
that prosopagnosia is a mild or moderate impairment 
of general-purpose face recognition, with faces most 
vulnerable simply because they are overall harder than 
nonface objects. However, a proponent of single-system, 
general-purpose object recognition might still question 
whether the faces and nonface objects used in these 
experiments were equivalently difficult on all relevant 
dimensions. For example, perhaps faces are harder than 
eyeglass frames on the dimension of inter-item similarity, 
but easier on the dimension of acuity. In this case 
prosopagnosia might not be face-specific, but simply 
a general impairment of individuating highly similar 
patterns. 
Inverted faces are an ideal type of nonface control 
stimulus for testing this hypothesis. They are equivalent 
to upright faces in virtually all physical stimulus par- 
ameters, such as spatial frequency, complexity, and 
inter-item similarity. Nevertheless, a large body of 
research on the "face inversion effect" (see Valentine, 
1988) suggests that inverted faces are not perceived and 
recognized using the same processes as upright faces: 
inverted faces are harder for normal subjects to learn as 
measured by recognition performance, and harder to 
perceive as measured by simultaneous matching per- 
formance. The inferior performance with inverted faces 
can be interpreted in terms of the specialization of face 
recognition processes for upright faces. Further evidence 
linking the face inversion effect to the operation of 
a specialized face processor which takes only upright 
faces as input comes from developmental studies, lateral- 
ity studies, and studies of the nature of face represen- 
tation. For example, Carey and Diamond (1977) report 
that the inversion effect is absent in young children, but 
as face recognition matures it also becomes vulnerable 
to the inversion effect. The right hemisphere, which 
is generally reported to be superior to the left at 
face recognition, also shows a more pronounced face 
inversion effect (Leehey, Carey, Diamond & Cahn, 
1978). Although faces are encoded into memory holisti- 
cally (i.e. without explicitly represented parts), inverted 
faces are not; they appear to be represented with the 
same degree of part decomposition as nonface objects 
such as houses (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). In sum, even 
though upright and inverted faces are identical in every 
way except their orientation, it appears that upright 
faces engage the processes by which we normally recog- 
nize faces and inverted faces do not, or do so to a lesser 
extent. 
In the present study, we assessed the face inversion 
effect in a prosopagnosic subject, in order to test the 
hypothesis of face-specific perceptual mechanisms in 
humans. We reasoned that if the prosopagnosic's under- 
lying impairment was not face-specific, then he would 
show a normal face inversion effect. In contrast, if he 
had suffered some degree of damage to neural tissue 
implementing a face-specific processor, he would 
show an absent or attenuated face inversion effect, 
thus providing evidence for the existence of a function- 
ally and anatomically distinct system for perceiving 
faces. Previous neuropsychoiogical research with non- 
prosopagnosic brain-damaged subjects has found mixed 
results with inverted faces. Yin (1970) tested nonproso- 
pagnosic right hemisphere-damaged subjects with 
upright and inverted faces and found a diminished face 
inversion effect, whereas Grusser et al. (1990) report 
that their nonprosopagnosic brain-damaged subjects 
performed consistently worse with inverted faces than 
with upright, particularly the right hemisphere-damaged 
subjects. 
METHODS 
Sub jects  
The prosopagnosic subject was LH, a 40yr-old 
man who has been prosopagnosic since an auto- 
mobile accident 20 yr earlier. When tested during his 
recovery, his verbal IQ was 132 and his performance 
IQ was 93. His main residual impairment is in face 
recognition. He is profoundly prosopagnosic, unable 
to recognize friends, neighbors or even his wife and 
children without extra-facial cues. His recognition of 
real objects and pictures is only mildly impaired, and 
his recognition of printed words is good. His ability 
to match faces is within the normal range, and he 
produces easily recognizable copies of unrecognized 
drawings, placing him in the category of associative 
(rather than apperceptive) visual agnosics. Brain damage 
from the accident and subsequent surgery consists of 
bilateral occipitotemporal lesions, and right frontal 
and anterior temporal esions. For additional neuro- 
psychological information please see Levine, Calvanio 
and Wolfe (1980). 
Note that research on prosopagnosia is generally 
confined to single case studies because of the rarity of the 
syndrome. It would of course be desirable to test the 
generality of our results with other prosopagnosics. 
Nevertheless, clear-cut and reliable findings obtained 
with LH can function as an "existence proof" at the 
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very least, and given that he was entirely normal prior 
to his injury in adulthood (i.e. he was a successful college 
student, and had no history of developmental, neuro- 
logical or psychological abnormality), we believe it 
is reasonable to assume that conclusions regarding the 
organization of his visual system can be applied to the 
human visual system in general. 
Normal subjects were also tested, in order to verify 
that the experimental paradigm would elicit the face 
inversion effect in nonprosopagnosics. These subjects 
were recruited from the undergraduate populations 
of Carnegie Mellon University and the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Materials 
Stimuli consisted of 15 different sketch-like depictions 
of male faces, created using the Mac-a-Mug program 
and differing from one another only in their internal 
features. These were paired to create 15 "same" pairs 
and 15 "different" pairs, for a total of 30 pairs. In all 
studies to be described, these pairs occurred equally 
often upright and inverted. Thus, 60 trials comprises 
one replication of all trial types. For studies run 
on a computer, faces subtended a visual angle of 
approx. 16 x 12 deg at a typical viewing distance, and 
subjects responded "same" or "different" by pushing 
labeled keys on the keyboard. For studies using laser- 
printed sheets of paper, the visual angle was approx. 
14 × l0 deg, and the subject said "same" or "different". 
Procedure 
Because of the profound face recognition impairment 
in prosopagnosia, we assessed face processing using a 
face matching task rather than a recognition task. LH 
and normal subjects were tested in a sequential matching 
task, in which an unfamiliar face was presented, followed 
by a brief interstimulus interval (ISI), followed by a 
second face, to which the subject responded "same" or 
"different". The first and second faces of a trial were 
always in the same orientation, and upright and inverted 
trials were randomly intermixed. 
Several studies were carried out, with different sub- 
jects, modes of stimulus presentation, and durations of 
stimuli and ISis as reported in Table 1. 
RESULTS 
The first study was undertaken to verify that our 
task would elicit the face inversion effect in normal 
subjects. As shown in Table 1, subjects were reliably 
more accurate and faster at matching upright than 
inverted faces. 
LH was the subject of the second study. Although 
he is able to match faces, he does so slowly and with 
more difficulty than a normal subject. Therefore, longer 
exposure durations and a shorter ISI were used. As 
shown in Table 1, LH was significantly more accurate 
with inverted faces. This outcome was not among the 
alternatives we had considered. We had assumed that 
if he had an impaired face processor, it would simply 
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not be used in this task, leading to the prediction of 
an absent or attenuated face inversion effect. Instead, 
it appears he has an impaired face-specific processor, 
which is engaged by the upright but not the inverted 
faces, and used despite being disadvantageous• 
To verify this counterintuitive r sult, we repeated the 
task in Study 3. The means were very similar to those 
of the second study, although the difference was not 
statistically significant. This is presumably because only 
half as many trials were completed. Combining the 
results of all testing so far with LH, the type II error 
probability of the inverted inversion effect is 0.001. 
In a fourth study, we administered 300 trials of the 
experiment to LH using a Macintosh portable computer. 
We used longer exposure durations and a shorter ISI 
than the previous studies because of LH's difficulty in 
seeing the liquid crystal display, which was not backlit. 
The precise time durations have unfortunately been lost, 
but we include this study for the sake of completeness. 
Table 1 shows that his performance was indeed poorer 
than before, even with the altered timing. Although there 
are trends in both accuracy and reaction time consistent 
with his previous performance, neither effect is statisti- 
cally reliable. 
A fifth study was undertaken as a final test of the 
inversion effect with both a good quality display and a 
large number of trials. The exact design of the fourth 
study was replicated with a Mac II computer. Table 1 
indicates that with the improved visual quality of the 
display, LH was able to perform well with relatively 
brief exposures, and again showed a significant inverted 
inversion effect in both accuracy and reaction time. 
Figure l(a) shows his accuracy for upright and inverted 
faces. 
Finally, in a sixth study normal subjects performed 
the task with the same display and timing as LH, 
and showed normal inversion effects in both accuracy 
and reaction time. Their mean accuracy for upright and 
inverted faces is shown in Fig. l(b). 
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FIGURE 1. Performance of LH (a) and normal subjects (b) at 
matching upright and inverted faces, shown for 1.5 sec each with a 
1.5 sec interface interval. Normal subjects how the classic "'face 
inversion effect"; LH shows an inverted inversion effect. 
DISCUSSION 
Two major conclusions follow from LH's inverted 
inversion effect. First, LH's prosopagnosia results from 
damage to a specialized face recognition mechanism. 
Previous findings of impaired face recognition relative to 
nonface object recognition used objects (vases, eyeglass 
frames, animal faces) that were at least as difficult as 
faces overall, but that may have been less difficult than 
faces along some specific dimension such as complexity, 
inter-item similarity, or a particular range of spatial 
frequencies. Inverted faces are the perfect control stimu- 
lus from this point of view, and LH's disproportionate 
impairment on upright relative to inverted faces is 
therefore strong evidence that an impairment of face- 
specific processing mechanisms underlies his proso- 
pagnosia. Assuming that LH was not anomalous prior 
to his injury, this in turn implies that the human visual 
system contains an anatomically distinct system that 
is functionally specialized for the perceptual analysis 
of faces. At the very least, it demonstrates that one 
apparently normal human had such a system. 
Our second main conclusion concerns the apparently 
mandatory application of face-specific processing 
mechanisms• It may seem paradoxical that if LH can use 
general (i.e. nonface-specific) visual pattern perception 
mechanisms to perform inverted face matching at a 
particular level of accuracy, he cannot also use these 
mechanisms on upright faces with at least the same 
degree of success. A similar paradox was noted by 
McNeil and Warrington (1993) when discussing their 
subject who had attained good proficiency at recognizing 
sheep faces, but whose human face recognition remained 
poor. Why could he not treat human faces as he does 
sheep faces? In the case of LH, his superior performance 
at matching inverted faces relative to upright faces 
shows that he cannot even perceive (let alone develop 
recognition strategies for) upright faces using the more 
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general visual pattern perception mechanisms that he 
applies to inverted faces. 
The idea that specialized perceptual systems, or 
"modules" would operate mandatorily was suggested by 
Fodor (1983). He reasoned that this was a desirable 
feature for modules because it would enable them to 
complete their computations more quickly than if a 
decision whether or not to engage them was required 
before they could be engaged. The concept of dominance 
by a specialized but impaired brain system has been 
invoked to explain the discrepancy between right hemi- 
sphere linguistic competence as measured in left hemi- 
sphere-damaged aphasics and in split-brain patients 
(Zaidel, 1985). However, inter-patient variability is an 
alternative explanation (Gazzaniga, 1983). In the present 
case such an explanation is not possible as the critical 
contrast is within a single subject. LH's performance 
with inverted faces gives us a measure of his ability 
to match stimuli of the same complexity, inter-item 
similarity, spatial frequency, and so on as upright faces. 
The fact that he performed worse with upright faces 
demonstrates that his specialized face perception system 
was contributing to his performance even though it 
was impaired and clearly maladaptive. Therefore, the 
"inverted inversion effect" provides the most direct 
neuropsychological support available for Fodor's (1983) 
characterization of special-purpose modules as engaged 
mandatorily by their inputs. 
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